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  :  
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
 Presently pending and ready for review in this defamation 
case is the motion for judgment on the pleadings and for summary 
judgment filed by corporate Defendants Implode-Explode Heavy 
Industries, Inc. (“IEHI”) and Krowne Concepts, Inc. (“KCI”).  
(ECF No. 127).  The issues have been fully briefed and a 
telephonic motions hearing was held on September 16, 2013.  The 
court now rules.  For the following reasons, the motion will be 
granted.1 
                     
1 The parties agree that the complaint will be withdrawn as 
against Defendant KCI and Penobscot Indian Nation (“PIN”) will 
be removed as a Plaintiff in this defamation action.  Krista 
Railey, proceeding pro se, is another Defendant in this action.  
Corporate Defendants’ counsel notes that she remains in default.  
That is incorrect.  Ms. Railey has answered and no default as to 
her has been entered. (ECF No. 112, at 114).  Furthermore, in an 
earlier opinion, this court held that Plaintiffs did not state a 
claim on the unfair business practice count and that count four 
in the complaint seeking injunctive relief did not set forth any 
cause of action.  (ECF No. 112, at 13-14).  Plaintiffs stated in 
an unrecorded teleconference that they are not pursuing those 
counts.    
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I. Background 
A. Factual Background  
The following facts are undisputed.  Penobscot Indian 
Nation (“PIN”) is a federally recognized Native American 
Government located in Maine.  PIN created the Grant America 
Program (“GAP”), which is a national program that “provides low 
to moderate-income homebuyers with a down payment grant to be 
used towards the purchase of a home.”  (ECF No. 1 ¶ 1).  
Plaintiff Global Direct Sales, LLC (“GDS”), a Maryland limited 
liability company with its principal place of business in 
Maryland, entered into an agreement with PIN whereby Global 
Direct would “develop, organize, and operate GAP.”  (Id.).  
Plaintiff Christopher Russell (“Russell”) was the founder and 
CEO of Ameridream, a not-for-profit seller-funded down payment 
assistance program (“SFDAP”) from 1999 to 2001.  Russell also 
served as a CEO of GAP, which partnered with PIN, and Plaintiff 
Ryan Hill (“Hill”) was co-owner and CFO of GDS.   
 GAP works as follows.  From a pool of funds, PIN provides 
grants to low to moderate-income homebuyers and first-time 
homebuyers to be used toward down payments.  Prior to closing, 
the grant is wired to the settlement agent.  At closing, the 
seller is charged an enrollment fee for enrolling the seller’s 
home in the program.  The enrollment fee replenishes the grant 
fund pool and “any excess is the property of PIN.”  (Id. ¶ 25).  
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The seller must certify that the sale price has not been 
increased to offset the seller’s contribution to GAP.   
 Defendant IEHI now owns and operates a website called “ml-
implode.com” (“the Website”).2  The Website’s mission is 
“transparency, education and accountability.”  (Id. ¶ 48; see 
also ECF No. 11-16, at 2).3  The Website provides that “[t]he 
site is a forum . . . [IEHI] add[s] a bit of editorial work to 
keep the site coherent, but it is a relatively small amount.”  
(ECF No. 11-6, at 2).   As of 2007, the Website had a core daily 
audience of approximately 100,000 visitors.  (ECF No. 1 ¶ 57).  
In approximately June 2008, IEHI offered Krista Railey 
(“Railey”) an opportunity to create her own blog on the Website 
called the “FHA Mortgage Whistle Blower.”  (ECF No. 132-3, at 
21).  At no point did IEHI employ Railey.  (ECF No. 132-3, 
Railey Dep., at 33 (“it was just a hobby I was doing . . . 
community service, so to speak”)).  Streamline Marketing, Inc., 
which is a company unrelated to IEHI, employed Railey at the 
time of the events in question here.  (ECF No. 18-2 ¶ 4).   
Railey was interested in SFDAPs, which is how she learned 
about Russell, Ameridream, PIN, and GDS.  In June of 2008, 
                     
2 KCI owned the website from March 15, 2007 until September 
1, 2007, when ownership was transferred to IEHI.  (ECF No. 127-
5, at 30-37). 
 
3 The specific purpose of the Website was “to track what was 
going on in the housing sector, mortgage lending sector.  And 
the larger economy.”  (ECF No. 109-2, Krowne Dep., at 17).   
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Railey “began developing a series of stories and information 
resources on [down-payment assistance programs].”  (ECF No. 18-2 
¶ 24).  On September 9, 2008, Railey drafted an article entitled 
“The Penobscot Indian Tribe Down Payment Grants,” which she 
intended to submit for internal review on the Website, but which 
was inadvertently published on her “Mortgage Whistleblower” 
blog.  (ECF No. 132-4).  Shortly after she inadvertently 
published the original version of the article, Railey received a 
comment from Russell threatening to sue her for “factual false 
statements” and “lies” in the article.  (ECF No. 18-12, at 2).  
Among other things, Plaintiffs found the following statements 
contained in the September 9, 2008 article objectionable: (1) 
that GAP is a scam; (2) that Russell had a copycat website of 
Ameridream; (3) that Russell and Hill treated Ameridream like 
their own personal piggy bank; (4) that the DP Funder program, 
which Russell and Hill created was another type of seller-funded 
down payment scam; (5) that the seller contributions to GAP is 
clearly a concession;  (6) that PIN isn’t really providing 
assistance and is merely laundering the down payment for a fee; 
(7) that Russell and Hill are already working on an alternative 
scheme through the Down Payment Grant Alliance; (8) that the 
taxpayers and FHA should not be forced to sponsor continued 
lending abuse via seller funded down payment grant schemes; and 
(9) whether the seller funded down payment grants are 
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administered by non profit companies, for profit companies, or 
Sovereign Nations, they are still a scam.  (ECF No. 1, at 7-8).   
 Shortly after she received Russell’s comments, Railey 
forwarded them to Krowne and the Website administrators, at 
which point “the draft article [was] permanently removed from 
the website.”  (ECF No. 18-2, at 8).  In response, Krowne and 
Randall Marquis, a contractor for IEHI who worked on 
advertising, business development, and was the senior editor of 
the mortgage content on the Website, (ECF No. 109-2, Krowne 
Dep., at 22), then edited Railey’s article, and removed the word 
“scam” from the article.  (ECF No. 18-13, at 2; see also ECF No. 
132-8, at 27, email exchange between Krowne, Marquis, and 
Railey, “we have taken the original post down, [Railey] has 
extensively edited it to ‘tone down’ the commentary to neutral, 
and we will not republish until it has been reviewed and ok’d by 
one of you.”).  Railey published the revised article on 
September 15, 2008 on her blog, entitled “What the SFDPA 
Administrators Don’t Want You to Know: Part 1, the Penobscot 
Indian Tribe Down Payment Grant Program.”  (Id.).  Railey “fully 
researched everything that appeared in both the September 9 
draft version and September 15 final version of the article, and 
both versions included links to supporting materials on which 
[her] article was based.”  (ECF No. 18-2 ¶ 31).  Railey’s 
research included interviewing Russell, “reading transcripts 
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from Congressional hearings about Plaintiffs . . . read[ing] 
articles published in reputable papers such as the New York 
Times and Forbes Magazine . . . research[ing] website 
registrations of various websites connected to Global Direct 
Sales, LLC, Russell, and Hill, and stored information and 
documents posted to those websites.”  (Id. ¶ 32).  She also read 
reports about “DAPs, FHA insurance, the tax treatment of DAPs, 
and other related topics, issued by such agencies as HUD, the 
U.S. GAO and the IRS.”  (Id.).  Plaintiffs similarly objected to 
the content of the revised September 15, 2008 article and 
consequently commenced this action.  
B. Procedural Background 
On September 19, 2008, PIN, Global Direct, Russell, and 
Hill filed a complaint in this court based on diversity 
jurisdiction asserting the following four causes of action 
against seven total defendants: (1) defamation; (2) libel; (3) 
unfair business practice; and (4) injunctive relief.  (ECF No. 
1).  Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction to halt 
publication of the Article (ECF No. 11), but the court denied 
their motion.  (ECF No. 28).  Defendants answered the complaint 
on November 18, 2008.  (ECF No. 29). 
 Three of the original defendants, Aaron Krowne, Justin 
Owings, and Lorena Leggett, were then dismissed for lack of 
personal jurisdiction.  (ECF Nos. 48, 49).  A fourth defendant, 
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Streamline Marketing, Inc. (“Streamline”), was dismissed without 
prejudice.  (ECF Nos. 85, 86).  On July 12, 2010, the court 
denied the remaining Defendants’ special motion to dismiss 
pursuant to Maryland’s “anti-SLAPP” statute,4 Md. Code Ann., Cts. 
& Jud. Proc. § 5-807, which, in certain circumstances, protects 
a party’s First Amendment rights when reporting on matters 
within the authority of a government body.  (ECF Nos. 92, 93).   
 On April 27, 2011 and May 9, 2011, counsel for IEHI and KCI 
filed motions to withdraw as attorneys (ECF Nos. 98, 101), which 
were granted on May 31, 2011 (ECF No. 104).  In its letter-order 
granting the withdrawal, the court informed IEHI and KCI that, 
as corporate entities, they must be represented by new counsel; 
otherwise, they would be subject to default.  (Id.).  When IEHI 
and KCI failed to respond appropriately within the requisite 
time period, default was entered against them.  (ECF No. 107). 
 On September 28, 2011, Plaintiffs filed a motion for 
default judgment against IEHI and KCI.  (ECF No. 109).  Aaron 
Krowne filed several documents in an attempt to respond on 
behalf of the corporate Defendants.  (See ECF Nos. 105, 110).  
As corporate entities, however, IEHI and KCI can only be 
represented by counsel, see Local Rule 101.1.a, and Mr. Krowne’s 
filings could not be considered.  Nonetheless, Plaintiff’s 
                     
4 “SLAPP” is short for “Strategic Lawsuit Against Public 
Participation.”  
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motion was denied on April 9, 2012.  (ECF No. 112).  On May 15, 
2012, Plaintiffs moved for a default judgment as to liability 
against Defendants IEHI and KCI, for summary judgment, and a 
permanent injunction.  (ECF No. 114).  On July 6, 2012, IEHI and 
KCI, represented by new counsel, filed a motion to vacate the 
entry of default against them.  (ECF No. 117).  On January 3, 
2013, the court granted Defendants’ motion to vacate and denied 
without prejudice Plaintiffs’ May 15, 2012 motion.  (ECF No. 
121). 
 Defendants IEHI and KCI filed the instant motion for 
judgment on the pleadings and for summary judgment on July 1, 
2013.  (ECF No. 127).  Plaintiffs opposed on July 26, 2013 (ECF 
No. 132) and Defendants replied on August 18, 2013 (ECF No. 
135).5   
II. Standard of Review 
A court may enter summary judgment only if there is no 
genuine issue as to any material facts and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  See Fed.R.Civ.P. 
56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); 
Emmett v. Johnson, 532 F.3d 291, 297 (4th Cir. 2008).  Summary 
judgment is inappropriate if any material factual issue “may 
                     
5 In the reply, Defendants object to certain evidence on 
which Plaintiffs rely in their opposition.  Given the 
disposition on Defendants’ motion, Defendants’ objections are 
now moot.  
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reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.”  Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986); JKC Holding Co. 
LLC v. Wash. Sports Ventures, Inc., 264 F.3d 459, 465 (4th Cir. 
2001).     
 A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary 
judgment ‘may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of 
[his] pleadings,’ but rather must ‘set forth specific facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’”  Bouchat v. 
Balt. Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 522 (4th Cir. 
2003) (quoting former Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)).  “A mere scintilla of 
proof . . . will not suffice to prevent summary judgment.”  
Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307, 314 (4th Cir. 2003).  “If the 
evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, 
summary judgment may be granted.”  Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 
249-50. (citations omitted).  At the same time, the court must 
construe the facts that are presented in the light most 
favorable to the party opposing the motion.  See Scott v. 
Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007); Emmett, 532 F.3d at 297. 
III. Defamation and Libel (Counts I and II)6 
 To state a claim for defamation in Maryland, a plaintiff 
must plead the following four elements: “(1) that the defendant 
made a defamatory statement to a third person, (2) that the 
                     
6 As this court noted in a prior opinion, Plaintiff’s 
defamation and libel counts will be analyzed as asserting a 
single cause of action.  (ECF No. 112, at 7).  
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statement was false, (3) that the defendant was legally at fault 
in making the statement, and (4) that the plaintiff thereby 
suffered harm.”  Offen v. Brenner, 402 Md. 191, 198 (2007).7  All 
four elements must be met.   
The dispositive issue is whether IEHI can be legally at 
fault for the allegedly defamatory statements made in the 
September 2008 article that Railey authored.  IEHI argues that 
the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”), 47 U.S.C. § 230, 
immunizes IEHI from this defamation action.  For the reasons set 
forth below, the court agrees. 
A. Overview of the CDA 
Recognizing that the Internet provides a valuable and 
increasingly utilized source of information for citizens, 
Congress carved out a sphere of immunity from state law claims 
for providers of interactive computer services to preserve the 
“vibrant and competitive free market” of ideas on the Internet.  
47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2); see also Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 
F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).  Congress enacted Section 230, in 
part, as a response to a New York state court decision, Stratton 
Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 
May 24, 1995), where an interactive computer service was held 
                     
7  “A defamatory statement is one which tends to expose a 
person to public scorn, hatred, contempt or ridicule, thereby 
discouraging others in the community from having a good opinion 
of, or associating with, that person.”  Offen, 402 Md. at 198-99 
(internal quotations omitted). 
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liable for defamatory comments made by one of its two million 
users.  H.R. Conf. Rep. 458, 104th Cong.2d Sess. 194 (Jan. 31, 
1996), 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 208 (“One of the specific purposes 
of [Section 230] is to overrule [Stratton] and any other similar 
decisions which have treated [interactive computer service] 
providers and users as publishers or speakers of content that is 
not their own because they have restricted access to 
objectionable material.”); see also Fair Hous. Council of San 
Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1163-64 
(9th Cir. 2008) (en banc); Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331.    
To further the policies underlying the CDA, courts have 
generally accorded Section 230 immunity a broad scope.  Nemet 
Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 254 
(4th Cir. 2009).  In one of the earliest cases involving the CDA, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
interpreted Section 230(e)(3) to bar all state law claims 
sounding in tort.  Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330.  The court observed 
that Congress did not want to “deter harmful online speech 
through the separate route of imposing tort liability on 
companies that serve as intermediaries for other parties’ 
potentially injurious messages.”  Id. at 330-31.  The court went 
on to state: 
Congress recognized the threat that tort-
based lawsuits pose to freedom of speech in 
the new and burgeoning Internet medium.  The 
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imposition of tort liability on service 
providers for the communications of others 
represented, for Congress, simply another 
form of intrusive government regulation of 
speech.  Section 230 was enacted, in part, 
to maintain the robust nature of Internet 
communication and, accordingly, to keep 
government interference in the [new] medium 
to a minimum. 
 
Id. at 330.  Notably, the reasoning in Zeran is now accepted by 
courts across the country, and “[t]he broad reach of the CDA to 
bar a panoply of torts is supported by other courts that have 
considered the CDA’s reach.”  See, e.g., Asia Econ. Inst. v. 
Xcentric Ventures LLC, 2011 WL 2469822, at *7 (C.D.Cal. May 4, 
2011) (collecting cases).  Moreover, Section 230 immunity, like 
other forms of immunity, is generally accorded effect at the 
earliest point in the litigation because it is otherwise 
“effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to 
trial.”  Brown v. Gilmore, 278 F.3d 363, 366 n.2 (4th Cir. 
2002).8 
                     
8 Although there is some disagreement in the circuits as to 
whether the statutory bar under Section 230 is an immunity or 
some less particular form of defense for an interactive computer 
service provider, the Fourth Circuit clearly views the Section 
230 provision as an immunity: “By its plain language, [Section] 
230 creates a federal immunity to any cause of action that would 
make service providers liable for information originating with a 
third-party user of the service.”  Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330.   
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B. Interactive Computer Service 
The CDA bars the institution of a “cause of action” or 
imposition of “liability” under “any State or local law that is 
inconsistent” with the terms of Section 230.  47 U.S.C. § 
230(e)(3).  As relevant here, Section 230 prohibits a “provider 
or user of an interactive computer service” from being held 
responsible “as the publisher or speaker of any information 
provided by another information content provider.”  Id. § 
230(c)(1).  Assuming a person meets the statutory definition of 
an “interactive computer service provider,” the scope of Section 
230 immunity turns on whether that person’s actions also make it 
an “information content provider.”  
Section 230(f)(2) defines an “interactive computer service” 
as any: 
information service, system, or access 
software provider that provides or enables 
computer access by multiple users to a 
computer server, including specifically a 
service or system that provides access to 
the Internet and such systems operated or 
services offered by libraries or educational 
institutions.  
 
Courts generally conclude that a website falls within this 
definition.  See, e.g., Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. Inc., 591 F.3d at 
255 (consumeraffairs.com, a website allowing computer users to 
post reviews of businesses and products on it, constitutes an 
interactive computer service); Fair Hous. Council of San 
Case 8:08-cv-02468-DKC   Document 138   Filed 09/18/13   Page 13 of 25
14 
 
Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1162 n.6 
(“Today, the most common interactive computer services are 
websites.”); Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 
F.3d 413, 419 (1st Cir. 2007) (“[W]eb site operators . . . are 
providers of interactive computer services” because “[a] web 
site . . . enables computer access by multiple users to a 
computer server, namely, the server that hosts the web site.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 
1018, 1030 n.16 (9th Cir. 2003) (recognizing that several courts 
have concluded that a website meets the definition of an 
“interactive computer service”); Levitt v. Yelp! Inc., 2011 WL 
5079526, at *6 (N.D.Cal. Oct. 26, 2011) (Yelp, a website 
allowing computer users to post reviews of businesses and 
products on it, constitutes an interactive service provider).   
There is no dispute in this case that “ml-implode.com” is an 
“interactive computer service” and that individuals who operate 
the site are “providers” within the meaning of Section 
230(c)(1). 
C. Information Content Provider 
CDA’s grant of immunity applies only if the interactive 
computer service provider is not also an “information content 
provider,” which is defined as “any person or entity that is 
responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or 
development of information provided through the Internet or any 
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other interactive computer service.”  Id. § 230(f)(3); see also 
Carafano v. Metrosplash.com., Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 
2003)(“Under the statutory scheme, an ‘interactive computer 
service’ qualifies for immunity so long as it does not also 
function as an ‘information content provider’ for the portion of 
the statement or publication at issue.”).  “While an overt 
creation of  content is easy to identify, determining what makes 
a party responsible for the ‘development’ of content under 
Section 230(f)(3) is unclear, and the CDA does not define the 
term.  Accordingly, courts often look to the totality of the 
circumstances in making the determination.”  Ascentive, LLC v. 
Opinion Corp., 842 F.Supp.2d 450, 474 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).  Case law 
also suggests that “one is responsible for the ‘development’ of 
information when he engages in an act beyond the normal 
functions of a publisher (such as deciding to publish, withdraw 
or modify third-party content) that changes the meaning and 
purpose of the content.”  See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1163.    
Taken together, CDA’s provisions bar state-law plaintiffs 
from holding interactive computer service providers legally 
responsible for information created and developed by third 
parties.  Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd., 591 F.3d at 254.       
Plaintiffs contend that “[b]y its terms, the grant of immunity 
found in Sections 230(c)(1) and (2) applies only if the 
interactive computer service is not also an ‘information content 
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provider,’ (ECF No. 132, at 24) but indeed an entity can be both 
an ‘interactive computer service’ and an ‘information content 
provider.’”  Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. 
Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 2008) (en 
banc).  “The critical issue is whether . . . [the interactive 
computer service] acts as an information content provider with 
respect to the information” at issue.  Carafano, 339 F.3d at 
1125 (citation and quotation marks omitted).9  Put differently, 
through Section 230, Congress established a general rule that 
providers of interactive computer services are liable only for 
speech that is properly attributable to them.  Nemet Chevrolet, 
Ltd., 591 F.3d at 254.  If the computer service provider only 
passively displays content that is created entirely by third 
parties, then it is only a service provider with respect to that 
content.  Hare v. Nik Richie, et al., 2012 WL 3773116, at *15 
(D.Md. Aug. 29, 2012) (“[i]n passing Section 230, Congress 
sought to spare interactive computer services . . .  by allowing 
them to perform some editing on user-generated content without 
thereby becoming liable for all defamatory or otherwise unlawful 
messages that they didn’t edit or delete” (quoting 
Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d at 1165)).  Unlike information 
                     
9 In this regard, Plaintiffs’ reliance on an earlier Order 
from Superior Court of the State of California is misplaced.  
(ECF No. 132-2, at 2).  The Superior Court’s rejection of 
defendants’ CDA argument in that case is inconsequential to 
whether this immunity applies to the facts before this court.    
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providers such as newspapers, magazines or television and radio 
station – all of which may be held liable for publishing or 
distributing defamatory material written or prepared by others - 
Congress explicitly decided to treat interactive computer 
services differently.  As the Fourth Circuit explained in its 
touchstone decision in Zeran v. America Online, Inc., Section 
230 “precludes courts from entertaining claims that would place 
a computer service provider in a publisher’s role.  Thus, 
lawsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable for its 
exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial functions – such 
as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter 
content – are barred.”  Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330.  It is 
“immaterial whether this decision comes in the form of deciding 
what to publish in the first place or what to remove among the 
published material.”  Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 
1102 n.8 (9th Cir. 2009).  For example, “an editor’s minor 
changes to the spelling, grammar, and length of third-party 
content do not strip him of [S]ection 230 immunity.”  Fair 
Housing Council, 521 F.3d at 1170.         
In this case, whether IEHI is entitled to immunity under 
Section 230(c)(1) turns on whether it acted as an information 
content provider with respect to the alleged defamatory 
communication at issue – the September 2008 article.  Applying 
the above principles to the undisputed evidence, IEHI is not an 
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“information content provider” under Section 230 with respect to 
the alleged defamatory article and is thereby immune from suit.    
First, Plaintiffs do not claim that IEHI created or 
authored either the September 9, 2008 version of the article, or 
the revised September 15, 2008 version.  It is undisputed that 
Railey authored both the September 9, 2008 and September 15, 
2008 articles (ECF No. 1 ¶ 5; see also ECF No. 132-10 ¶ 3).  In 
fact, the complaint plainly states that “Defendant Railey 
individually and/or through . . . Streamline Marketing wrote and 
published the untrue and defamatory article.”  (ECF No. 1 ¶ 51).  
Streamline Marketing is unrelated to IEHI, a point which 
Plaintiffs do not dispute.  Furthermore, Plaintiffs assert that 
“[t]he commentary and content of the untrue and defamatory 
article are attributable to Krowne and Owings as author(s) of 
the website.”  (Id. ¶ 47) (emphasis added).  Krowne’s and 
Owings’s ownership of the website in and of itself, however, 
does not subject IEHI to liability for an allegedly defamatory 
article that a third-party, Railey, authored.  Holding IEHI 
liable for mere control of the website on which allegedly 
defamatory content was published is precisely the type of 
conduct that falls squarely within the protections of the CDA.  
See, e.g., Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd., 591 F.3d at 259 (upholding CDA 
immunity because “[t]here is nothing but [plaintiff’s] 
speculation which pleads Consumer-affairs.com’s role as an 
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actual author in the Fabrication Paragraph”); see also Zeran, 
129 F.3d at 331 (“[i]nteractive computer services have millions 
of users . . . [t]he specter of tort liability in an area of 
such prolific speech would have an obvious chilling effect”).  
In fact, IEHI maintains that it “did little more than provide a 
canvas upon which third parties placed material.”  (ECF No. 127, 
at 19).  Specifically, IEHI asserts that Railey wrote about a 
topic of public interest and IEHI merely provided a forum for 
her to do so.  (Id.).10  It is undisputed that Railey was not 
IEHI’s employee; instead, she maintained a blog on Defendant’s 
website called the “FHA Mortgage Whistle Blower,” on which she 
posted the September 2008 article.  (ECF No. 18-2, at 2); see 
Bobolas v. Does 1-100, 2010 WL 3923880, at *2 (D.Ariz. Oct. 1, 
2010) (“the [Communications Decency] Act does provide that 
GoDaddy cannot be held liable for defamatory statements made by 
bloggers”).     
On that score, even though Plaintiffs assert that the 
September 2008 article (either the initial or final version) was 
a “joint effort” between Railey and IEHI, Krowne testified that 
the “joint effort” was in creating Railey’s blog portion of the 
Website, not the allegedly defamatory article.  (ECF No. 109-2, 
                     
10 Railey developed an interest in down-payment assistance 
programs (“DAP”) from “HUD’s attempts to shut down seller-funded 
DAPs and the DAP providers’ attempts to protect them.”  (Id. at 
7).   
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at 32).  In fact, after Plaintiff Russell complained about the 
initial version of the article, which Railey explains she 
intended to have reviewed internally before publication, Krowne 
wrote to Railey that he didn’t have the time to “look into this 
case” and advised her that if she thought it was worth pursuing, 
he “would recommend getting an investigative journalist to do an 
‘assist’ on the story.”  (ECF No. 117-1, at 10).  This is 
consistent with Krowne’s other communications with Railey 
regarding the article.  For instance, on September 10, 2008, in 
response to Railey’s question of whether [Krowne] wanted to 
“remove the blog entry or just the word ‘scam,’” Krowne asked if 
Railey thought there were any factual weaknesses in what she 
wrote and further stated that since he did not “do the 
investigation . . . [he didn’t] have a good sense of whether 
[the article was] worth defending.”  (ECF No. 132-8, at 3).   
Plaintiffs maintain, however, that IEHI worked with Railey 
as a content provider because it was “intimately involved in 
developing and creating the article.”  (ECF No. 132, at 23).  
Plaintiffs conclude that “[t]he facts prevent IEHI from simply 
putting its hands up and blaming an independent blogger.”  (Id. 
at 25).  Plaintiffs assert that Railey received direct input 
from Krowne, that Marquis performed research and that drafts 
were exchanged, and IEHI had the last say on what was published.  
(ECF No. 132, at 4-5).  Plaintiffs, however, attempt to hold 
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IEHI liable for decisions related to monitoring and publication 
of content on its network – “actions quintessentially related to 
a publisher’s role.”  Green v. America Online, 318 F.3d 465, 471 
(3rd Cir. 2003) (upholding immunity for the transmission of 
defamatory messages and a program designed to disrupt the 
recipient’s computer because Section 230 proscribes liability 
where interactive computer service merely promulgates harmful 
content or fails to address certain harmful content on its 
network); Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. America Online, Inc., 
206 F.3d 980, 985-86 (10th Cir. 2000) (upholding immunity for the 
online provision of stock information even though AOL 
communicated frequently with the stock quote providers and had 
occasionally deleted stock symbols and other information from 
its database in an effort to correct errors).     
Nowhere does the record suggest that IEHI contributed to 
the alleged defamatory piece in a way that rose to the level of 
an “information content provider” under Section 230.  After 
Russell objected to Railey’s publication of the September 9, 
2008 article, which she inadvertently posted, Railey followed up 
with “additional verifications and revisions” and then posted 
the final article on September 15, 2008.  (ECF No. 18-2 ¶ 30).  
Indeed, under Section 230(c), “so long as a third party 
willingly provides the essential published content, the 
interactive service provider receives full immunity regardless 
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of the specific editing or selection process.”  Carafano, 339 
F.3d at 1124 (emphasis added).  Thus, Railey’s statement that 
“Mr. Krowne and Randall Marquis of IEHI and Krowne were the 
editors of the article before it was published” does not defeat 
IEHI’s immunity under Section 230(c) given the Fourth Circuit’s 
broad pronouncement in Zeran - and later courts’ acceptance of 
the standard set forth therein – that “lawsuits seeking to hold 
a service provider liable for its exercise of a publisher’s 
traditional editorial functions – such as deciding whether to 
publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content – are barred.”  
Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330 (emphasis added).  Thus, even assuming 
Krowne edited or altered the content of the allegedly defamatory 
article, IEHI would still be immune under the law of the circuit 
in which this court sits.   
The evidence indicates that Krowne was not completely 
uninvolved with the allegedly defamatory article, but his 
involvement was limited to editorial work, which is insufficient 
to transform IEHI into an “information content provider” with 
respect to the allegedly defamatory September 2008 article.  
(See ECF No. 127-4 ¶ 32, Krowne Decl.) (“[a]t no time did I, or 
to my knowledge any IEHI staff, ever directly change, or cause 
to be changed, any portion of Railey’s article about Plaintiffs 
(either the preliminary or final versions), with the exception 
of ‘the header’ which [Krowne] placed into the article text in 
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July 2011, directing visitors to the ‘retraction/rebuttal’ 
provided by Russell and Railey.”).    Krowne’s review included 
“some corrections,” but in large part he thought it was “a solid 
piece . . . [and did not] . . . suggest[sic] any substantial 
changes to it.”  (ECF No. 109-2, at 55); see Nemet Chevrolet, 
Ltd., 591 F.3d at 258 (finding that plaintiff failed to plead 
facts to show any alleged drafting or revision by the website 
was “something more than a website operator performs as part of 
its editorial function”).  In Railey’s own words, she “fully 
researched everything that appeared in both the September 9 
draft version and September 15 final version of the article, and 
both versions included links to supporting materials on which 
[her] article was based.”  (ECF No. 18-2 ¶ 31).  Railey’s 
retrospective doubts about the article’s integrity after the 
fact are immaterial to IEHI’s responsibility.  (ECF No. 132-10 ¶ 
6, Railey Decl., “I believe there are significant problems with 
the final published article.  I believe that the article 
contains and implies false statements of fact and is misleading 
in a material manner”).    
Nor do Plaintiffs suggest that IEHI’s control over the 
alleged defamatory article exceeded editorial functions – it is 
IEHI’s involvement as an editor to which Plaintiffs attempt to 
attach liability – albeit to no avail.  Defendant’s mere 
agreement with the content of the article does not give rise to 
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liability for defamation.  See S.C. v. Dirty World, LLC, 2012 WL 
3335284, at *4 (W.D.Mo. Mar. 12, 2012) (holding that “merely 
encouraging defamatory posts is not sufficient to defeat CDA 
immunity.”); see also Global Royalties, Ltd. v. Xcentric 
Ventures, LLC, 544 F.Supp.2d 929, 933 (D.Ariz. 2008) (holding 
that operator of consumer review website entitled “Ripoff 
Report” was entitled to Section 230(c)(1) immunity and stated 
that, although it was obvious that a website entitled Ripoff 
Report encourages the publication of defamatory content, there 
was “no authority for the proposition that this makes the 
website operator responsible, in whole or in part, for the 
‘creation or development’ of every post on the site”); Zeran, 
129 F.3d at 330 (narrow construction of the CDA would frustrate 
the statute’s intent by discouraging service providers from 
voluntarily regulating third-party contributions to their 
websites).         
Plaintiffs point to Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando 
Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 
2008), as the leading Ninth Circuit case on the scope of the 
CDA, but that case involved factual circumstances 
distinguishable from those here.  Whereas the website in 
Roommates.com arguably required users to input illegal content 
as a necessary condition of use, there is no evidence on the 
record that IEHI structured its website to require bloggers or 
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individuals leaving commentaries to input illegal content as a 
condition of using the Website.  Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 
1164.  Even though Plaintiffs argue that IEHI monitored what 
Railey wrote about as a blogger, “a service provider’s exercise 
of its editorial prerogatives as to information from another 
content provider does not transform the service provider into 
the content provider under [Section] 230.”  Jane Does v. 
Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F.Supp.2d 288, 297 (D.N.H. 
2008); see also Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1030-1032 (holding that an 
online newsletter was an “interactive computer service” but that 
its administrator was not an “information content provider” of a 
third-party’s allegedly defamatory e-mail message even though 
the administrator selected, lightly edited, and published its 
contents).   
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs’ defamation (and libel) 
claims against IEHI are barred by the CDA.   
IV. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, the motion for summary judgment 
filed by Defendant IEHI will be granted.  A separate Order will 
follow. 
  /s/      
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW    
United States District Judge  
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